Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines:
Strategies to End the Violence
Testimony of G. Eugene Martin, U.S. Institute of
Peace Executive Director of the Philippine Facilitation Project, before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Published:
March 14,
2007
By:
G. Eugene
Martin
Gene Martin testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on
"Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Strategies to End the
Violence."
I appreciate the opportunity to
participate in this hearing on the tragic extrajudicial killings in the
Philippines. Having lived in the Philippines for six years and now working to
facilitate the peace process in Mindanao between the government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), I am well aware of the many political, economic
and social issues underlying these violent acts.
The Philippine Facilitation
Project of the U.S. Institute of Peace is an excellent model for active U.S.
engagement in conflict situations. At the request of the State Department, the
Institute has been working for nearly four years to end conflict between the
central government in Manila and the Islamic Moro people of Mindanao. The
centuries long conflict has made the southern Philippines one of the most
violent areas of the country. The Institute is actively exploring with
negotiators from the Philippine government and the MILF alternatives for
resolving the long conflict. As an independent, non-partisan federal
institution, the Institute is able to promote U.S. interests unofficially. Our
work gives us insights into the causes of violence in society, not only in
Mindanao but nationwide. That said, my remarks represent my opinion based upon
my experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.
Root Causes of Violence
G. Eugene Martin testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on March 14, 2007.
I believe there are two
underlying causes of the violence. First, weak political and social institutions,
particularly a corrupt and ineffective justice system, prompt citizens to
resolve conflicts on their own. When one cannot obtain justice through the
police or courts, alternative means are found. This can be through direct
personal action, drawing upon family or clan support, or arranging for criminal
or revolutionary organizations to settle matters.
In Philippine society, family is
primary. Nearly any action can be justified if it is to support the family.
Kinship ties extend well beyond the nuclear family, into clans and tribal or
community groups. Identities often are based on familial or, being an island
nation, geographical relationships rather than broader nationalism. In
Mindanao, much of the violence is caused by clan conflicts, known as “rido,”
which can continue for generations. Absent access to, or confidence in, justice
through legal mechanisms and institutions, the aggrieved party often takes
direct action against the perceived offender to obtain satisfaction.
The fractious nature of society
leads to weak political institutions. Elite families who hold political and
economic power in much of the country often seek to maintain their power in any
way possible. Elections tend to be corrupt, candidates running against
incumbents are often the targets of harassment if not violence, and voters are
threatened with retribution for opposition to power holders. Prime targets also
for threats and violence, including killings, are media or civil society
investigators into political and economic corruption.
The second underlying cause of
violence is the legacy of the Marco dictatorship. Martial law politicized the
institutions of government and violence against anyone perceived to be opposed
to government policies was tolerated if not authorized. Soldiers, police,
judges and prosecutors became perpetrators of violent actions against broad
segments of the population. Extralegal arrest, detention, incarceration,
disappearances and killings (known as salvaging) were condoned and used to
advance the regime’s power and reduce political opposition.
Many of those who opposed the
Marcos regime responded in similar fashion. Lacking legal of safe alternatives,
many allied themselves with revolutionary organizations for protection and
influence. These included the National Democratic Front (NDF) of the Communist
Party of the Philippine (CPP) and, in Muslim areas, the Moro National
Liberation Front and subsequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While many
if not most of those who affiliated with the NDF during martial law years were
not communist, the NDF provided the only available support network against
Marcos. Marcos’ militarized response to the historical struggle of the Moros
against Manila’s colonial policies enhanced the appeal of those who advocated armed
violence to counter military and militia pogroms against Muslim civilians. The
violence of the Marcos regime abetted the communist insurgency and Moro
decisions that safety was possible only through independence from the
Philippines rather than by working within the political system.
Current Situation in the Philippines
I believe the present rash of
violence and killings is the result of political instability and weakness.
President Arroyo has expressed her determination to address and resolve the
killings. She established the Independent Commission to Address Media and
Activist Killings, headed by former Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Melo.
She also welcomed the investigation of Professor Philip Alston, the Special
Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council. However, I question her capability
to take the necessary steps to end the killings. She has been politically weak
since her controversial election in 2004, depending upon support from military
and provincial leaders to counter impeachment measures by her opponents in
Congress. She has promoted military officers who support her and placed retired
military and police officers in high-level civilian offices. Her challenge to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to eliminate the decades old communist
New Peoples Army (NPA) insurgency within two years has given the AFP a green
light to take any action it wishes against the NPA and their allies. Faced with
a persistent low-level NPA insurgency, the military resorts to stretching
counterinsurgency strategies to branding leftist organizations as enemies of
the state that can be intimidated or eliminated by any means.
The communist insurgency is a
serious threat to the Philippine government and democracy. The world’s last
remaining Maoist insurgency, the NDF, uses violence and abuses democratic
privileges to advance its power. As a legal political movement, NDF leaders are
elected to Congress where they continue to oppose the administration and seek
to block or destabilize government policies. During election campaigns, the NDF
uses kidnappings, “revolutionary” taxes, threats and violence to support its
candidates and harass opponents. The Party’s political goals are to weaken the
government, gain power through coalitions and eventually replace the democratic
system with an ideological communist dictatorship.
One of the legacies of the Marcos
regime is the continued alienation of many civil society elements from the
government and especially the military. NGOs, religious bodies, academics,
small farmers, and indigenous peoples remain suspicious of government officials
and military personnel because of the oppression and violence used against them
during martial law. Many government officials, particularly in the armed forces
and police, reciprocate the mistrust, seeing a communist hand behind civil
society protests against administration policies and actions. Powerful elites
influence local police or military commanders to use force against farmers’
complaints over land grabs or workers’ demonstrations over working conditions.
Murders of activist farmers and labor leaders in rural provinces are covered
up. Journalists investigating the crimes become targets. Similarly, prosecutors
and judges are intimidated. Tragically, the result is further alienation from and
resistance to the government.
The killings have become a major
issue within the Philippines, yet there is little public outrage despite the
release of the Melo Commission report and the initial criticisms of the Special
Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council. Public perceptions are influenced by
military and official attributions that most of the killings are internal
CPP-NPA purges. Most civil society reaction has been from leftist oriented NGOs
rather than mainstream organizations, further limiting public concern.
Short-Term Prospects in the
Philippines
While we all hope the killings
will stop immediately, I am not optimistic in the short run. I am confident,
however, that through conscientious efforts by Philippine political and civil
society leaders, as well as international partners such as the United States,
this cycle of violence can be halted.
My pessimism over short-term
remedial action by the government is based upon the following:
·
It is
election time again. Campaigning for national elections on May 14 is well
underway. Little if any serious effort will be exerted to investigate killings
of political significance. In fact, as contesting parties struggle to win by
any means, there will likely be an upsurge of campaign related violence.
·
Candidates
from left-wing political parties will be particular targets. National Security
Advisor Norberto Gonzales stated on March 8 that such candidates must not be
allowed to win seats in the Congress. The Gonzales view that party-list
candidates “are under the direct influence of the communist party” gives a
potential hunting license to military and local officials who agree with him.
·
The new
anti terrorism law, which President Arroyo signed on March 6, gives new “legal
teeth” to the government’s war on terrorism. The Arroyo administration
describes the law, titled the “Human Security Act of 2007,” as being “very
concerned on human rights.” Many observers fear the law may increase unfettered
military operations against opponents deemed to be terrorists. National
Security Advisor Gonzales has already stated that the NPA will be labeled a
terrorist organization when the new law is promulgated. Legal leftist
organizations and elected individuals may be designated.
·
The new
Defense Secretary, Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr., is a retired police officer. He
succeeds a civilian. Senior Department of National Defense officials are now
mostly former military officers rather than civilians. Secretary Ebdane likely
will promote military perceptions of security threats. UN Rapporteur Alston
stated “the AFP is in a state of almost total denial...of its need to respond
effectively and authentically to the...killings...attributed to them.”
The killings and the state of
democracy in the Philippines have implications for U.S. interests. Prolonged
United States support for the Marcos regime in order to save our military bases
alienated many in the Philippines. U.S. Ambassador Kenny has rightly expressed
official U.S. concern over the extrajudicial killings. However, other U.S.
interests—counter terrorism cooperation and training opportunities the AFP
provide U.S. forces – may limit pressure on the Arroyo administration.
The U.S. Institute of Peace
involvement in the Mindanao peace process provides insights into many of these
issues. It is readily apparent that there are multiple, often uncoordinated,
policymakers in the Arroyo administration with diverse agendas. The President
has authorized her negotiators to propose a forward-looking self-determination
package to the MILF. Yet, military officers in central Mindanao continue to
support local political leaders who use their militia as private armies to
contest MILF influence. The Arroyo administration avoids exercising national
authority over local political and economic interests opposed to a peace
agreement with the Moros so as to retain their support against administration
opponents. It expends little effort to counter biased or incorrect media
reports on Mindanao events.
Recommendations
The U.S. and other nations are
not without influence to help end the violence of extrajudicial killings. The
Philippines is sensitive to and dependent on the goodwill and support of its
neighbors and international donors. Some useful tools include:
·
Donor
nations and international financial institutions already have strong
anti-corruption requirements for economic assistance. Linking assistance to
forceful judicial reform and independent investigations of the killings would
enhance the resolution of the cases.
·
Philippine
desires to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Corporation assistance gives
the U.S. influence to demand rigorous action against the killings.
·
The
sizeable defense relationship the U.S. has with the Philippines provides a
mechanism to encourage civilian control over the armed forces.
·
Forceful
public U.S. official support for human rights reforms and protections would
counter some Filipino perceptions that U.S. concern over the killings is
tempered by our efforts to counter terrorism.
Model for Success
The U.S. Institute of Peace has
established a unique relationship with key players in the peace process in
Mindanao. Working with minimal publicity, the Institute has made a significant
contribution to the progress in the talks over the past four years. The
Institute has worked closely with civil society to foster open debate to
mitigate Filipino public prejudice and discrimination against the Moro
minority. Engaging NGOs, church leaders, educators, and media representatives,
the Institute seeks to change public perceptions of the conflict and the
benefits a durable peace agreement would bring the nation. Similar programs
focused on highlighting a need to end the extrajudicial killings and to bring
perpetrators to justice could help strengthen judicial institutions and public
demands for resolution of the killings.
The Institute’s peace efforts
supplement Embassy, USAID and the Pacific Command’s counterterrorism and
developmental programs and priorities. Working independently but cooperatively with
these official U.S. agencies, the Institute addresses the political, religious,
historical and social issues underlying the conflict. Parallel programs dealing
with judicial reform, civilian control over security forces, and amelioration
of the communist insurgency could begin to address the causes of the killings.
Institute efforts to reduce intra-Moro clan and tribal conflict through support
for dialogue and cooperation among the next generation of Moro leaders could be
duplicated in other conflict situations, which now end in political killings.
Regrettably, the State
Department’s support for the Institute’s facilitation project is ending just as
the peace process is at a critical juncture. Once the negotiators reach
agreement on outstanding issues, a politically contentious, long-term
transition period to implement the agreement will require close monitoring and
engagement. Granting the Moros self-determination will alter power
relationships in Mindanao. The potential for extralegal violence is real.
Continued Institute presence is critical to help both Muslim and Christian
communities through this difficult period. Without renewed funding, however,
the Institute’s unique investment of trust and credibility with key players
will be lost prematurely.
The coordinated approach U.S.
agencies, the Institute of Peace, neighboring countries and international
donors have used to advance the Mindanao peace process can be replicated to
resolve the extrajudicial killings. U.S. interests would be served and the Philippines
would benefit.
Thank you Madam Chairman. I
welcome your questions and those of your colleagues.
The views expressed in this
testimony are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does
not take positions on policy issues.
March 14,
2007
Issue
Areas:
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Source: http://www.usip.org/publications/2007/03/14/extrajudicial-killings-in-the-philippines-strategies-end-the-violence
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